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MANAGING IDENTITIES AMONG EXPATRIATE BUSINESSMEN 
ACROSS THE SYRIAN-LEBANESE BOUNDARY 
 
ElizabethPicard 
 
 
 
Faced with the challenge of state formation in the Middle East since the First World War, 
government authorities had to overcome a number of common difficulties in their attempts at 
creating a political community on their new national territory. The most frequent was to 
establish agreed fixed international boundaries separating the domestic realm from the 
exterior, the world of (supposed) social solidarity from the world of Leviathan. In this respect, 
the separation of Lebanon from Syria bore similarities with the demarcation between Syria 
and the new Turkish state. A foreign colonial power (France) played a significant role in the 
negotiation, mingling its own interests with those of the new local governments, and tipping 
the power scale between the local states in order to achieve its own political ambitions. 
Hence, the transfer of Iskanderun to the Turkish state in 1939, or the carving out of Greater 
Lebanon in 1920.    
Another similarity was the length of the interstate crisis in relation to border fixing in spite of 
periods of appeasement. In the case of Syria and Lebanon, as in the Syrian-Turkish case, the 
crisis lasted well after independence, and international boundaries are still a topical question 
today. Official declarations at the time of independence in 1943, and the simultaneous 
adhesion of Beirut and Damascus to the League of Arab States the following year, seemed for 
a while to clarify the bilateral relationship. However, although most (not all) of the territorial 
boundaries between the two states were finally agreed upon, their meaning and political 
implications remained subject to public debate. Moreover, the two related questions of the 
separation of Syria and Lebanon, and of the inclusion within Lebanon of peripheral areas 
carved out of the Ottoman wilâya (province) of Damascus, such as the Biqaa, Tripoli and 
Akkar, were reopened years later, during the Lebanese civil war. They continue to nourish a 
political controversy to this day. 
A third similarity has to do with the functionality of the international boundary, and more 
specifically with the discrepancy between state boundaries and social (ethnic, linguistic, 
religious, tribal) boundaries. However, in the Syrian-Turkish case, strong nationalist doctrines 
contributed to impose a sharp distinction between Turkish and Arab identities as the only 
legally relevant national distinction, thus provoking a stream of migrations, forced 
assimilation, and marginalisation of the various minorities remaining within each state. In the 
Lebanese-Syrian case, the circumstances were different, as the two states could not claim a 
different ethnic identity: their populations were both Arab. However, their international 
boundary cut across communal territorial continuity (as in the case of the Sunnis from Tripoli 
on the Lebanese coast to Homs in the Syrian hinterland, for example), or communal solidarity 
(as in the case of the Druzes in the Lebanese Shuf and the Syrian Jabal al-Arab). Moreover, 
active communal networks (such as those linking the Orthodox Christians from various cities 
of the Levant) operated across the boundary. 
If not according to an ideological definition of national identity based on ethnicity (Smith 
1986: 23-35; Aflaq 1962: 242-249), on what criteria could the distinction be made between 
the Lebanese and the Syrian states? More specifically, on what criteria has the border between 
Syria and Lebanon been not only drawn but also accepted, challenged, lived, interpreted, 
imagined – all activities that can be summed up as its invention? These questions call for an 
examination of its formation process, its changing image over time, as well as the variety of 
actors involved in the process.  
Besides the legal drawing and official keeping of the international boundary, its mental, 
ideological and practical uses involve a large variety of actors. It would be meaningless to 
make a distinction between those who take responsibility for defining the boundary (the 
international system, the Syrian and Lebanese political authorities), on the one hand, and 
those on whom the boundary is imposed and who sometimes utilise it (such as traders, 
smugglers, migrant workers, tourists, transnational private and public institutions, etc.), on the 
other. At a given time, each of them for his (her) own part gives meaning to the border 
through his (her) discourse and practices, and contributes to the plurality of its meaning. 
Inventing the boundary also implies that social and political actors draw on collective values 
and norms that change over time, according to change in the regional configuration and in the 
domestic arena as well as in the relations between the domestic and the regional realms. In 
Lebanon, for example, the border with Syria was seen and dealt with differently during the 
statist Shihabist period (1958-64), the fling of ultra-liberalism that succeeded it, the civil war 
(1975-90), and the post-war reconstruction period. In Syria, the officers who seized power in 
the late 1940s, the Unionist leaders of the United Arab Republic (1958-61), the Ba‟thist 
regime after 1963, all looked at the boundary with Lebanon through different eyes.  
To this synchronic diversity and diachronic variation in the definition of the border, a third 
dimension had to be added after the Cold War. Globalisation had new effects on the 
international system. It led to the blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign 
realms, between public and private spheres, in matters of security, markets, communication as 
well as in the formation of social movements. It contributed to the withering of the 
Westphalian notion of state sovereignty: the Weberian monopoly of the use of legitimate 
force, the territorialisation of state power, the separation between the state and other social 
actors (Migdal 2001: 26). It gave density, and sometimes autonomy, to the border area 
through the creation of free zones, the granting of dual citizenship, the bilateral management 
of public goods, and new configurations of meaning.   
Within the framework drawn by the three notions of synchrony, diachrony and globalisation, 
this chapter aims at examining the process of construction/deconstruction of the Lebanese-
Syrian border from the point of view and through the practices of one group of actors whose 
contribution to the process can be considered strategic. The group concerned is made up of 
the Syrian businessmen who had left Syria since the creation of the United Arab Republic in 
February 1958 and had settled, and prospered, in Lebanon. Choosing a non-governmental 
actor in order to analyse the international boundary separating Lebanon from Syria imposed 
itself. In most of the studies already available on the subject, the boundary has been examined 
in a classic international relations perspective privileging the state, and even more in a narrow 
governmental perspective (Qubain 1961; Dawisha 1980; Chehade 1990), thus ignoring 
complex processes and dynamics. Also, analysing the distinction between Lebanon and Syria 
by means of the examination of businessmen‟s representations and strategies allows us to 
bridge the gap between international relations and political economy, and possibly to throw 
light on the domestic structures that make the specificity of each state with regard to the other 
(Evangelista 1997: 217-222). While I am aware that by choosing to examine one set of actors, 
this chapter offers only a limited view of the Lebanese-Syrian boundary, what it intends to do 
is to shift the perspective and shed a new light on the shaping of this border, and on its 
meaning. 
 In order to reflect upon the redefinition of the Lebanese-Syrian border since the end of the 
civil war in Lebanon and following the second Syrian economic infitâh(opening) in 1991, two 
„critical junctures‟ (Collier and Collier 1991: 31) are successfully examined, in which these 
businessmen contributed to the (re)definition of the border : (i) the period of their emigration 
to Lebanon (1960-65) and (ii) the early years of the of the Syrian regime‟s involvement in the 
Lebanese civil war (1976-82). Privileging the examination of strategic junctures and periods 
of crisis (Dobry 1986) over the observation of continuities imposed itself in view of the 
existing documentation as well as the narrative of the actors. In spite of their economic power 
and, as discussed in the chapter, their political influence on, and at some point ethical 
leadership in, the Lebanese polity, the Syrian businessmen of Lebanon have not been studied 
by historians, sociologists, or by political scientists to this day.
1
 One could even suggest that 
they have successfully managed to remain hidden. As a matter of consequence, the main 
sources documenting the present study are the discourses of members of the business 
community themselves, interviewed in informal non-directive sessions in 2000-2002.
2
 
Although the interviewees had a natural tendency to insist on their formative years when 
asked about their life story, most of their testimony made clear that the two periods cited 
above (1960-65 and 1976-82) were of special importance. They offered a clue to the 
understanding of their posture and strategy during the course of the new Syrian-Lebanese 
relations in the 1990s-2000s. 
 The main argument of the chapter is that ottomanismoffered an implicit but still efficient 
reference for modern actors of the Near East when dealing with their economic and political 
environment, even after the creation of nation-states such as Syria and Lebanon. Here, 
ottomanism is used in its anthropological (and somehow a-historical) dimension. It refers to 
shared sensitivity, culture and arts de faire –what today‟s sociologists call a common public 
sphere –inherited from four centuries of Ottoman rule over the lands stretching along the 
Eastern shores of the Mediterranean.
3
 Throughout this period, a constant flow of human, 
material and symbolic exchanges between the Near Eastern provinces was inspired by a 
nomadic habitus that contradicted territorialisation and the stabilisation of identities and 
belongings. This flow was a strong indication of the ecological and cultural unity of the 
region, especially through its linguistic characteristic (the common use of Arabic since the 
seventh century), its sectarian identities (mainly Sunni and Greek Orthodox) as well as its 
traditional social mode of domination – the rule of landowners and urban notables. 
Sociabilities developed at the regional level, spreading families around in several cities, and 
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 A notable exception is the excellent but unpublished MS thesis submitted by Rania W. Ghosn, Syrian Elites’ 
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 It should be clear that I am not referring to ottomanism as the intellectual and political nationalist movement 
that spread throughout the Empire inthe early 1900s, as studied by Hasan Kayali (1997).  
encouraging individual mobility during professional lifetime. In the political realm, 
patrimonialism was a common characteristic of local powers whose incumbents generally 
imposed an authoritarian rule on populations they considered to be subjects – not citizens, 
while clientelism pervaded elite-mass relations. All these common characteristics wove a 
shared, if not unified, social and economic space known as Bilâd al-Shâm(Damascus‟ land), 
that offered a base for regional political designs long after the fragmentation of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
 Lebanon and Syria became independent nation-states only twenty-five years after the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire. A large majority of the notables who were entrusted with political power 
in Beirut and Damascus at the time (Hourani 1946) had personally experienced Ottoman 
governmentality – meaning the mode of exercising power (Foucault 1997: 655). While 
Lebanon officially endorsed the Ottoman heritage through the adoption of political 
communalism and the National Pact of 1943 (Akerli 1993: 184-192), the new Syrian military 
and revolutionary leaderships were prompt to reject it, only to enhance its conservation within 
the society and its instrumentalisation by extra-parliamentary opposition forces (Seale 1965: 
74).  
 Far from withering away at the end of the Ottoman era, ottomanism persisted within the 
societies of the Near East as a paradigm of discourse, and mode of functioning of domestic 
and trans-border relations. It did not matter only for the religious, landowning, and 
administrative notables (a
c
yân) whose heirs had managed to stay in power in the first years of 
independence. By means of penetrating in the minds of the people of every layer and segment 
of the local society (with specific modalities and meanings for each layer and segment), it 
remained a structure of signification for state policy and popular sensitivity as well as for 
actors‟ strategies long after the disappearance of the Empire. Ottomanism even met a new 
fortune in the late 1970s in reaction to the flaws in the process of nation-state building in 
several Arab countries, the re-mobilisation of communal identities, and the growing porosity 
of international boundaries to religious, ethnic and political movements (Picard 1993: 160-5). 
Thus, the social, economic, and political practices of the local actors constantly referred, 
consciously or unconsciously, to a regional and networked definition of space (Denoeux 
1993: 11-25), as discussed here in the case of the Syrian businessmen who settled in Lebanon. 
Add to this that, in recent decades, globalisation offered a favourable background to 
ottomanismthrough its „natural‟ support for trans-boundary identities and networks, as well as 
the development of a new partnership between the state and private actors according to the 
requirements of governance (Rosenau 2003). 
  
When Syrian Businessmen Fled to Lebanon 
 
The departure of the business community from Syria, and the settlement of some of its 
members in Lebanon, can be considered two steps of a unique process, according to the „push 
and pull‟ theory. I therefore examine the circumstances and causes of the departure of the 
business community from Syria, and then their beginnings in Lebanon. In order to understand 
the significance of the international border in the process, I take into consideration the 
common cultural references of Lebanon and Syria, then the preferential choice of Lebanon by 
the Syrian bourgeoisie.  
 
 
Exile and settlement 
 
The departure of the Syrian business community from Syria in the late 1950s and 1960s was 
considered a forced departure by the majority of the interviewees. Actually, it was the result 
of a deep divorce between Syria‟s new revolutionary leaders and the entrepreneurial class. 
Before the revolutionary period, the societies, economies and polities of Lebanon and Syria 
had been closely related and very similar since independence: in both countries primordial 
solidarities and communal loyalties prevailed over a nascent national integration. After twenty 
years of Mandate and in the wake of the Second World War their economies were still mainly 
agricultural and outward-oriented. In both countries landowners, new industrialists, and 
traders aimed at forming a „power block‟ in the Gramscian sense (Portelli 1972: 86-9) that 
spurred leadership. In Beirut as in Damascus the polity was officially organised according to 
republican parliamentarism, but was actually permeated by pervading clientelism.  
 Only with the dispute over the financial incomes of the Intérêtscommuns, especially the 
customs taxes, did contradictions grew between the import-export merchants in Beirut who 
were in favour of an ultra-liberal economy (Shehadi 1987), on the one hand, and industrialists 
in Damascus and Aleppo who advocated state control(Sadowski 1984: 152). Syria opted out 
from the zone franc in 1950, and its government began to exert control over the national 
industry and agriculture (Heydemann 1999: 177). At that time, there was no contradiction 
between a rapidly growing state apparatus and the entrepreneurial class – big landowners who 
developed extensive dry farming, new industrialists or private bankers – in spite of the 
establishment of successive military regimes between 1949 and 1954.
4
 Only popular 
demonstrations against the triple aggression at Suez (1956) signalled a change in the political 
balance of forces. Even in the first years of the United Arab Republic, the limited land reform 
imposed by the Nasserist regime was of little concern to the land-owning aristocracy (Métral 
1980: 298-300). As for the nationalisation of a few industrial companies, it was promulgated 
only in late 1961 (Ducruet 1969: 54). 
 Things changed when the Ba‟th party came to power in March 1963, a date that really 
marked the end of the liberal age and the downfall of the traditional notables. It also marked 
the rupture and the beginning of an open confrontation (such as in Hama in April 1964) 
between the Syrian business community and the new radical-populist regime. A series of 
actions against private enterprise were adopted: the nationalisation of banks and exchange 
control (May 1963), of 90 per cent of industrial companies (January 1965), of 80 per cent of 
external trade (1967), as well as the adoption of an extensive land reform between 1963 and 
1966. Excluded and repressed within Syria, the capitalists had no external resources to check 
the Ba„thist policies. They soon became conscious of the contradiction between their interests 
and those of a committed populist regime. Acceleration of the transfer of their money out of 
the country began as early as 1963. With capital fleeing the country, a large part of the 
entrepreneur elite chose to leave as well, which neither the bureaucrats nor the new Ba„thist 
militants would be able to substitute for. In four years (1963-7), several hundred thousands of 
people (out of a population of some 5 million) – Syrian businessmen and their families – left 
their country. In consequence, Syria was soon hit by a severe economic crisis. 
 Lebanon welcomed a large part of the Syrian capital and manpower, even though the brief 
„civil war‟ of the summer of 1958 bore witness to the fragility of the country. Syrian capital 
brought in between 1958 and 1970 has been estimated at 500 million LL.
5
The balance of 
border movements noted by the Lebanese national security police indicated that the number of 
Syrians in Lebanon doubled between 1963 and 1969.
6
 In sharp contrast, the early 1960s saw 
Syria in growing political and economic turmoil, while Lebanon experienced the most 
peaceful and prosperous period of its history. In Beirut, the short civil war episode in 1958 
                                                 
4
 According to Winder (1962-3), merchants and capitalists have made up around 10 per cent of all cabinet 
ministers from 1946 to 1958. 
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According to Dubar and Nasr, 1976: 356. It represents approximately $1.5 billion. There is much speculation 
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billion. Ghosn in her footnote 19 quotes an official report published by The New York Times (17 May 1966) 
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6
From 129,509 on 1 January, 1963 to 255,264 on 1 January, 1969.Direction Centrale de la Statistique, Recueil de 
Statistiques Libanaises (Beirut: Ministère du Plan 1969) quoted in Lamothe, 1975: 67. 
had ended with the establishment of a more respected and more efficient government. The 
state was slowly institutionalising (creation of the Banque du Liban in 1964), while transport, 
the public services, and the banking sector took advantage of the new oil prosperity in the 
Gulf (Dubar and Nasr 1976: 67-9). The growth of the processing industry and the tertiary 
sector (70 per cent of GNP in 1970) offered plenty of well qualified jobs and high profits. 
 The new Syrian immigrants arrived at a favourable time in a country with relaxed 
legislation and endless private accommodation. While private banks were closing in Syria, 
new branches were opening in Lebanon to which Syrian financial activities were soon 
relocated, and their managers resettled. Capital transferred by Syrian expatriates was 
preferably entrusted to Syrian-managed banks, which soon became hegemonic in the 
Lebanese banking system. According to a recent report, 22 out of 70 of the bank directors in 
Beirut in 1971 were of Syrian origin (mafhoum: 7). As for traders and industrialists, whereas 
they were able to transfer (illegally) only a part of their capital, they benefited from their high 
education, their proficiency and skills, while they brought with them their networks of clients 
and suppliers. Some had only to transfer their previous activity such as the production or 
import of building materials, spinning or cloth mills. Others took advantage of the trauma to 
invest in new booming market niches such as pharmaceutical products or the importing of 
cars. Things were less easy for landowners who received forty-year bonds in compensation 
for their lost domains, and took years transferring some of their financial assets and gradually 
selling parts of their remaining properties,and they did not always succeed in entering new 
business. On the whole, Syrian expatriate businessmen would rather invest in de-
territorialised activities such as trade and banking – a practice common among emigrants all 
over the world.     
When telling the story of their departure and crossing the border, most of the interviewees 
evoked an atmosphere of emergency and a forced exodus. They said they had to leave places 
and belongings all of a sudden; they remembered their family clinging together in the car, the 
truck overloaded with hastily piled up furniture; they recalled difficult negotiations at the 
customs and the payment of bribes. While their narration contains all the stereotypes of forced 
exile of the kind shared by so many other refugees around the world (Mehlman 2000), most of 
those concerned also alluded to one or several journeys back to Syria in the following weeks 
or months, in order to sell a property, settle a pending business deal, or visit those members of 
the family who had chosen to stay behind, and sometimes retained their position in the public 
administration under the new regime. While some cases were reported of people arbitrarily 
jailed for a few days, which spread anxiety among the business community, they were neither 
banned from Syria nor physically threatened in general. Rather, they chose to enter Lebanon 
not because their survival was at stake, but because they wanted to regain the liberal 
atmosphere that had sustained their past prosperity.   
Globally, the economic success of the Syrian businessmen in Lebanon was remarkably fast, 
just like anywhere they settled (the United States, Canada, France)
.7
 But in Lebanon, it was 
especially „smooth‟, as put in English by one of the interviewees. Entrepreneurs from Syria 
were soon propelled among the most important and richest bank managers, in the import-
export sector, and in industry as attested by the fact that an eminent Syrian family ranked 
among the seven largest industrialists of Lebanon in the early 1970s. It is difficult, however, 
to estimate their success, due to the difference of attitude towards wealth and economic 
success in Beirut and in Syrian society at the time. The social history of the Levantine Arab 
provinces has given birth to a different ethos according to the religious context (Christians 
being more extrovert than Muslims), the inscription within  international space (hinterland 
cities being isolated, while the coast had long been open to foreign influence), the relation to 
time (Syrian entrepreneurs privileging long-term investments and legal institutions, while 
their Lebanese counterparts looked for rapid gains, and endeavoured to take advantage of 
fluid situations and changes of fortune), the relation to money (the austerity of the Syrian 
bourgeoisie contrasting with the prodigality and ostentation of the rich Lebanese), etc.  
 In actual fact, the émigré Syrian entrepreneurs became integrated extremely rapidly within 
the economic as well as the social Lebanese elite. They soon occupied leading positions 
because they had received an excellent education, and were far-sighted, and ambitious: They 
were the perfect example of „learning capitalism‟.8 However, they did not fully adopt the 
economic practices and daily manners of their Lebanese partners which were distinct from 
their own business ethic and social values. They insisted on the inner border that distinguished 
them from the Lebanese, and stuck to the collective values of their (national) community, 
although striving to blend into the society of their new homeland – an apparent contradiction 
rightly depicted as „intimate nearness of difference‟ by Rania Ghosn. Tending to concentrate 
in specific neighbourhoods of Beirut – the richer in Hay as-Sarâsîq, Aleppians in Badâro, 
Damascus Sunnis in Ras Beirut – the new Syrian expatriates did not usually appear in public, 
did not participate in political life, and were hardly mentioned in the press, in sharp contrast to 
the Palestinian economic and financial elite at the same period (Ben Mahmoud 2002: 80-95). 
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 The expression is Joseph Maïla‟s, a Lebanese vice-recteur of the InstitutCatholique de Paris. Interview, 3 June 
2002. 
 A large majority of the new immigrants sought and were granted Lebanese citizenship, 
anxious as they were to raise a legal boundary between them and the Syrian government. 
Most of them found rapid and easy ways to do this: Either they „returned‟ to the national 
choice initially made by their family in the first years of the Mandate (1923-5) by putting 
forward their father‟s Lebanese citizenship, and asserting they had never been Syrian. Or they 
took advantage of the granting by Camille Chamoun in 1958 of Lebanese citizenship to 
thousands of Near Eastern Christians. They sought the patronage of a Lebanese leader, the 
protection of their community clerics, or managed to bribe a civil servant in the Ministry of 
the Interior. Only a few had to wait until the large wave of naturalisations in 1994 to become 
Lebanese. However, as the naturalisation process could drag on for years, families had to 
search for solutions to travel, often as expensive as the purchase of a South American 
passport. While it cannot be said that they feared specific threats from the Syrian regime (as 
did political opponents who had also taken refuge in Lebanon in the same period), their 
willingness to adopt Lebanese citizenship was rarely restrained by any Syrian patriotism. In 
other words, they did not share a „diasporic consciousness‟ (Cohen 1997) linking their 
individualistic pride to their national (Syrian) identity, although the Syrian law makes it 
impossible to renege on Syrian national identity. In consequence, their crossing of the national 
border may be analysed as the result of a rational choice made in order to maximise individual 
gains. While their strategy took place in a deeply antagonistic configuration with Lebanon, 
which considered itself a haven of pro-Western democracy threatened by the radical stance of 
its pro-Soviet Syrian neighbour (Kerr 1967), the Syrian business community in Lebanon 
contributed to the strengthening of the Syrian-Lebanese boundary by their quality of „border 
people‟ (Wilson and Donnan 1998: 4).  
 In the early decades, the group lived in denial of its origins. Syrians tried to dissimulate 
their shâmî or Aleppan accent in public places; they refrained from alluding to their past life. 
While aiming at facilitating their integration into the Lebanese elite, the strategy of smoothing 
the difference paradoxically went along with a deep consciousness of collective identity, a 
great care for collective memory and home traditions, as attested by the preservation of 
culinary customs as well as the frequency of endogamous marriages – although not as 
numerous as marriages with Lebanese from the same religious sect. This double-edged 
strategy of „entryism‟ and withdrawal is reminiscent of the destiny of the French pieds noirs – 
at least the wealthiest of them – who, incidentally, left Algeria in the same years, with their 
eagerness to forget a bitter past and make a new life. Like the pieds noirs in France, the 
Syrian émigrés blended into Lebanese society while feeling estranged from it. Like them, they 
were to be confronted by their memory three decades later, through an unpredictable turn of 
history. 
 
 
Foreigners but not Strangers 
 
Rejection by Syria of its class of businessmen (the push factor, according to migration 
sociologists) combined with the pull of the Lebanese (or rather Beiruti) economic space in the 
mid-1960s. Push and pull are not sufficient to explain the preference for Lebanon on the part 
of the Syrian business community, nor its discreet but undeniable success in the country. Of 
course, many other Syrian exiles chose to settle in other places, mainly in the Americas, and 
soon in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates, especially Muslims. To illustrate the specificity 
of his choice, one of the interviewees commented on a photograph of his promotion‟s 
graduating day in a prestigious Syrian secondary school in the 1960s (he himself had left 
Damascus in 1967 at the age of 20), and remarked that 26 out of 30 of the students on the 
photo had also left Syria. Among them, only two had settled in Lebanon, and their choice bore 
a special meaning.  
 This is where the Ottoman paradigm appears heuristic. For, contrary to the expectations of 
so many entrepreneurs and analysts of the nation-state in the Near East, the establishment of 
modern territorial states did not put an end to the solidarity and circulation of members of 
extended families – âl,â’ila, ahlorhamûla – from one city of the region to another, nor to the 
effectiveness of networks organised around marriages, genealogy and traditional alliances. 
Every city in the Near East, from Aleppo to Nablus, from Jaffa to Tripoli (not to mention 
Alexandria in Egypt), shared the same social structure and a similar urban culture, and 
members of extended families felt at home wherever they moved. At the time of 
independence of Lebanon and Syria, for instance, several ministers in each country were 
related by marriage: Riyadh al-Solh married the niece of Sa‟dallah al-Jabri, Abdallah al-Yafi 
a cousin of Khalid al-Azm, Muhsin al-Barazi married Solh‟s sister, SelimTaqla had been born 
in Homs, etc. (Zisser 2000: 15, 100, 165, 187). In 1960, a rich industrialist family based in 
Beirut and Damascus could pride itself on having a deputy in the Lebanese parliament, and 
another in the Syrian one.      
Throughout the twentieth century, the existence of these trans-boundary networks allowed the 
elite to survive political reversals thanks to its regional mobility. For example, Syrian leaders 
often had to take refuge in Transjordan at the time of the French mandate. Incidentally, 
another group of Syrians had already emigrated to Beirut two decades before the 1950s: the 
Christian (and, in lesser numbers, Sunni) trading and land-owning bourgeoisie who left 
Iskanderun after the Turkish takeover of the province in 1936-9. This tradition was extended 
after independence, when the MardamBeys became accustomed to residing between 
Damascus and Beirut (MardamBey 1994). During the 1950s, Khalid al-„Azm had to take 
refuge in Beirut on several occasions, and finally settled there (Azm 1972).  
 Although the new entrepreneurial Syrian elites (khâssa or nukhba) of the 1950s and 1960s 
originated from a lower social stratum and were more numerous and diversified than the old 
notables (a
c
yân), they also adopted the Ottoman logic by extending their business networks in 
the region and especially to Beirut, even after the creation of the two states. In the years 
following independence, Syrian banks either opened a branch in Beirut or were legally Syrian 
Lebanese institutions. Every trader and merchant from the hinterland had an office in Beirut 
harbour, the more so because Lattakiah was still under construction. Every businessman 
recalls the dispatching of a son or a younger brother to the Lebanese capital in order to open 
an office. Most of them had a second house there, where members of the family would live 
permanently. They all grew used to travelling to Beirut for business purposes and, for some of 
them, to commuting weekly along the 80 kilometres of bad road linking the two capital cities. 
Around a quarter of them (although the sample is not representative) had married in Lebanon 
before settling in the country, and most of them had attended a Lebanese boarding school, and 
spent the summer in the Lebanese mountain. They had established close relations and 
friendships in Lebanon, which they were able to make use of at the time of their emergency 
arrival. 
 One of the interviewees resorted to a lexical invention in order to describe the circulation of 
members of his social group in the regional space, and their ease in adapting to political 
contingencies and local conditions on either side of the Lebanese-Syrian boundary. „We are 
straddlers‟, he said (in French, chevauchants)‟. Another stressed that Beirut used to be 
secondary, compared with Damascus, for his family business (banking and industry) for 
several decades. It was only in the 1960s that the Damascus branch of the family joined up 
with the Beirut branch that had already settled there in the early 1920s. And in a few cases, 
the family left behind one or two members when leaving Syria, thus allowing them to manage 
their remaining properties by „remote control‟. Later on, in better times, they might become 
the junior partners of their prosperous cousins in Lebanon, as discussed in the final part of this 
chapter. More than the entrepreneurial mind or appetite for profit, this family dimension 
(should I say „this familiarity‟?) explains the success story of the exiled Syrian businessmen 
in Beirut. Unlike so many political and economic migrants around the world, unlike those 
Syrians who preferred a distant exile, they were foreigners – but not strangers – in Lebanon, 
thanks to the strength of ottomanism. 
 
 
Deepening the Political Divide 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the border between Lebanon and Syrian is less a historical 
than a political boundary, and even less a natural boundary separating two distinct 
geographical identities. In spite of official clarifications during the 1936 negotiations for 
independence between France and each of Syria and Lebanon, and notwithstanding friendly 
cooperation between the elites of both states after 1943, irredentism, on the Syrian side, and 
mistrust among the Lebanese leadership attested to the persistence of deep ambivalence in 
Lebanese-Syrian relations. With the successive changes of regime in Damascus from March 
1949 on, each country became a refuge and base for the political opponents of the other: For 
example, Syrian Social Nationalist Party members fled to Damascus after their failed coup in 
Lebanon in 1949. Ex-Syrian ministers and even presidents chose Beirut for a peaceful retreat 
after they had been ousted from power. Syrian politicians of all kinds plotted the next 
revolution or military coup in the crowded cafés along the CornicheRaouché or in summer 
mountain resorts. Syrian military and police squads as well as members of special units would 
more often than not track them down across the border (Rathmell 1995: 167), thus provoking 
deep tensions between governments now ideologically alienated, and turned into enemies. 
Following the climax of the crisis of 1958 – with Lebanon obtaining the dispatch of a UN 
observation mission to check Syrian military infringements of its national territory – trans-
boundary security operations and political pressures on the Lebanese government became 
Syrian usual practice, the more so after the Ba„thist-military coalition seized power in 1963. 
Interestingly, this kind of practice can be analysed altogether as de-territorialised, in relation 
to criminal networks outside the Middle East (Seurat 1989: 91-6), and as related to 
Damascus‟s Greater Syria territorial ambitions with regard to Palestinian, Jordanian and 
Lebanese lands and polities (Pipes 1989). 
Most of the Syrian business community settled in Lebanon kept voluntarily away from 
governmental unfriendly interplay. First, their stakes were clearly in the economy, not the 
politics of Lebanon, notwithstanding the fact that their past experience had broken the spirits 
of many of them. Intellectuals like Edmond Rabbath, who wrote extensively about the history 
and institutions of Syria and Lebanon while showing little interest in the fate of his family 
shares in the newly nationalised Khumasiyyaweaving company, were the exception.
9
 
Second, the kind of banking and trading activities they were mainly involved in required that 
they observe „positive neutrality‟, as said by one of the interviewees, in other words openness 
to market opportunities regardless of the social and political configuration that sustained 
them. As long as the Lebanese regime provided a secure environment for the market through 
an exceptional array of ultra-liberal legislation (such as banking secrecy or freedom of 
dismissal for employers), the Syrian émigrés were willing to become part of the „merchant 
republic‟ with its neo-Phoenician ideology (Shehadi 1987). Their attitude was not inconsistent 
with the relative disaffection they (like the traditional notables) used to display for politics, 
and even more for public policies, in Syria during the 1940s and 1950s, which had caused 
their estrangement from the rest of Syrian society and, finally, their loss of political power on 
behalf of representatives of other social classes.   
It came as no surprise that the Syrian exiled community showed some interest in the 
„reformist‟ attempts (harakat al-tashihiyya) by the new regime of Hafez al-Asad in the early 
1970s. In the Syrian Parliament, a few seats were tacitly allocated to „independent‟ candidates 
in the 1973 legislative elections. Simultaneously, the Ministry of the Economy adopted a few 
measures encouraging investment and private business, and allowing émigrés to sell their 
remaining frozen properties. Indirect messages were also sent to businessmen in Beirut, 
offering them the opportunity to regularise their sons‟ military status (the younger generation 
had escaped the universal draft)
10
 as well as to recover some of their properties (families 
houses but also land, and a few factories), in expectation of their return to Syria. Although 
some of them seized the occasion to settle their relations with the regime, to receive a limited 
compensation for their loss, and to confirm their Syrian citizenship by registering their 
children, very few agreed to return for more than a visit. Not only was the Lebanon of 1970-
75 at the height of its economic prosperity, boosted by a sharp rise in oil revenues following 
the October 1973 war, but Asad could hardly persuade them to return since he was 
remembered as having been part of the Ba„thist leadership that had endeavoured to turn Syria 
into a „popular democracy‟, and had led the disastrous June 1967 war. 
In actual fact, the first Syrian infitâh did not last, and the growth of the 1970s was mainly 
attributable to public investments thanks to Arab subsidies. For the few businessmen who 
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chose to re-invest in Syria, it was a short-lived and somewhat unsuccessful experience. 
Nevertheless, Syrian society did not manifest hard feelings towards them, and the émigrés 
were numerous among the half million people who took refuge from the war in Lebanon 
during several months in 1975-6. They also got into the habit of flying abroad from Damascus 
airport during the years when Beirut airport at Khaldeh was inaccessible to the inhabitants of 
the Eastern Christian regions. In the town of their origins, in their own family house, among 
their parents and ancient neighbours, they discovered with astonishment and emotion that they 
were still the sons of their fatherland. Whatever their denial, their Syrian identity had been 
concealed, but not lost. 
The war in Lebanon, however, induced a process of invention and crystallisation of collective 
identities on an ethnic and confessional basis that did not spare the Syrian émigrés (Makdisi 
2000). Only during the early months of the Two-year war (1975-6) was alignment still 
conceivable on a class basis. While several Muslim entrepreneurs opted to try new beginnings 
in the Gulf or in Europe, others moved from West to East Beirut in order to escape the 
mayhem of the „Palestinian Progressist‟ movement, by seeking the protection of the Christian 
militias. Soon afterwards, it became clear that East Beirut solidarity involved rapprochement 
either with Camille Chamoun‟sParti National Libéral or to the Phalangist Lebanese Forces of 
the Gemayels. Syrian Sunnis, and also Orthodox, whom an ancient history of peaceful urban 
cohabitation with the Sunnis made particularly suspicious to the Maronite leadership, were 
especially pressed to choose between the two camps. Although they tend to be discreet on the 
subject, the émigré business community hinted that they had to pay a heavy financial tribute 
to the PNL or the LF in the tradition of the khûwa extracted from city dwellers of the Near 
East by their Bedouin protectors, in order to be allowed to carry on their activities (Picard 
2000: 304). Like their Lebanese counterparts, many of them were driven willy-nilly into 
international and domestic trades, and financial and real estate transactions that benefited 
firstly their new patrons. Banks, especially, were involved in money laundering, while arms, 
oil and illicit goods trade bred enormous profits, sometimes also precipitating the ruin of an 
unwise investor. As a consequence, the fifteen-year period of war saw rapid and unexpected 
changes in the distribution of wealth among the Syrian expatriate community. It was hardly 
perceptible at the time, although it portended new social hierarchies in the post-war 
reconstruction period. 
The war caused another important re-alignment, political this time, as the tactical alliance 
between the Christian leadership and the regime of Hafez al-Asad encountered a revers of 
fortune due mainly to regional circumstances in 1977: the visit of Anwar al-Sadat to 
Jerusalem, his acceptance of a separate peace with Israel, and the subsequent hasty 
reconciliation between Syria and the PLO. Anti-Palestinian feelings, partly fed by the harsh 
competition between Palestinian and Syrian economic actors in the Lebanese arena, had 
already brought the Syrian business community closer to the Christian Lebanese Forces. Now, 
for decades to come, Syria would figure as the main enemy of the Christian forces – an enemy 
described indistinctly as Muslim (in spite of the crackdown of the Ba„thist regime on its 
Islamic opposition in 1982), „socialist‟ (referring to its statist economy), and dictatorial 
(because of the overwhelming power of its military and governmental elite).  
Who could be more sensitive to these accusations than the Syrian émigré businessmen? They 
were only hesitant to acknowledge the first charge for, although Christian in their majority 
(especially in East Beirut since the beginning of the war), they originated from a multi-
confessional (not to say secular) milieu whose economic interests ignored communal 
boundaries. But the two other accusations rang a loud bell in their minds. They had left Syria 
because of a doctrinaire takeover of the national production and trade by the state. They had 
been faced with a Ba„thist regime that had invested itself with illegitimate power, and had 
found no resource against it in the law. Then, in 1969, and again in 1973 for several months, 
they had witnessed the economy of Lebanon being almost paralysed by the political blockade 
imposed by Damascus on road transport, in an early demonstration of the hegemonic 
ambitions of Syria with regard to its Lebanese neighbour. In 1978, as the Syrian army 
advanced inside Lebanon and imposed its rule on every region except the South bordering on 
Israel, the central Christian region became physically encircled and politically isolated. The 
boundary between liberal Lebanon and authoritarian Syria was being moved closer to the 
exiles. It took on the limits of the „Eastern areas‟ controlled by the Lebanese Forces, and 
disturbing news began to spread about Syrian military searching for young Syrians in 
Ashrafiyeh in order to enrol them by force. Siding with the Christian forces under Bashir 
Gemayyel, and sometimes fighting in their ranks, appeared not only logical but necessary to 
some of them, confronted as they felt themselves to be with the perspective of a second forced 
exile, were the Syrian military to succeed in taking over the central Christian region. 
In consequence, Christian militias such as the Tanzim, and the Lebanese Forces under the 
leadership of Bashir Gemayyel from 1978 to 1982 (thereafter, internal divisions in the militia 
would arouse disaffection and cautiousness), received the support of two very different kinds 
of Syrians. The first category was made up of Syriac fighters recruited in the miserable 
quarters of East Beirut, whose extreme poverty and ancient animosity towards Muslims (they 
were refugees from the terrible First World War ethnic cleansing in southern Turkey) made 
them perfect mercenaries. The others were members of the émigré business community who 
decided to throw their money, influence and competence behind the so-called Christian side. 
They were to be found at various levels of the LF apparatus, even within the military council 
assisting Bashir. Unsurprisingly, the most radical Lebanistsamong the LF leadership – in the 
sense of being opposed to Syrian domination but also supporters of a homogenous Christian 
smaller Lebanon even at the price of secession and collusion with Israel – were of Syrian 
origin. Later on, when the luck of the LF turned and its leadership had to acknowledge the 
Syrian power on the ground and abide by its rule, these militants of Syrian origin were 
particularly vulnerable to reprisals from Damascus and its Lebanese allies. At the intermediate 
level, militants and fighters had little choice but to emigrate again, this time to Canada and 
Australia. In the upper ranks, family and business networks were of great effectiveness in 
smoothing the relations with the Syrian command, because families had cleverly maintained 
the tradition of diversifying their alliances, places of settlement, and political orientations, and 
also because they were able to strike lavish economic deals with their new Syrian patrons.  
Nevertheless, the reverse of loyalty displayed during the war by these members of the 
expatriate Syrian bourgeoisie, although a minority phenomenon, sheds an interesting light on 
the representation of the Lebanese-Syrian border in their narrative; its implicit coincidence 
with a communal divide (Lebanon being the Christian, and Syria the Muslim state), and its 
strong ideological dimension, economic liberalism being equalled to political freedom on one 
side of the boundary, statism to the suppression of civil and political rights on the other. 
Through the self-image of these actors caught in the confrontation between their country of 
origin and their country of adoption, questions arose: How contingent was such a political 
divide? How resistant would it be to historical change? And what would be the role of the 
exiled community in consolidating, or blurring, the international boundary after the war? 
 
 
The Production of a Regional Space 
 
The period beginning in 1990 saw drastic changes in the political life of Syria and Lebanon as 
well as in their bilateral relations. It is no coincidence that these important changes took place 
in the context of globalisation, with the vanishing of Soviet influence in the Middle East, and 
the growing intervention of the Washington-based multilateral institutions in the ailing rentier 
economies of the region, through a string of political conditionalities supposed to help 
reorganise public administrations and bring democracy to the people. In the wake of the 1990-
91 war against Iraq, international consensus and local weariness brought the Lebanese civil 
war to an end with the implementation of the November 1989 Taif agreement. As for Asad‟s 
Syria, it took two path-breaking steps simultaneously: Participating, although with 
reservations, in the Madrid Arab-Israeli peace process, and launching an economic initiative 
to private investors and entrepreneurs through the adoption, notably, of Law 10 of 1991. 
Although discussing the multiple aspects of the transformation of Lebanese-Syrian relations 
after 1990 goes beyond the framework of this chapter, it is important to stress three 
characteristics that help analyse the new role of the Syrian expatriate business community in 
Lebanon during this period. First, the war ended with an almost complete Syrian takeover of 
the external and domestic security of Lebanon, and the demobilisation of all militias except 
Hizbollah, Syria‟s close ally and bras armé in the South. With tacit international consensus 
(including the United States and Israel), the sovereignty of Lebanon was then downgraded, 
transforming it into a „quasi-state‟ (Jackson 1990). Behind its formal return to constitutional 
life and the rehabilitation of its national army, the ultimate power lay henceforth in Damascus, 
and was exerted through a chain of Syrian military and security command all over the 
Lebanese territory. 
Second, de-ideologisation became a characteristic of the Lebanese and Syrian polities, while 
common collective norms and political practices drawn from a living Ottoman heritage 
substituted for the dead ideologies. In Syria, Ba„thist references to Arab unity and socialist 
redistribution gave way to a crude display of power and a cult of the supreme leader. The 
regime soon made it clear that the limited economic liberalisation was not to open the door to 
the formation of political parties outside the National Progressive Front (Jabha wataniyya), 
nor to criticism of its human rights record and core leadership. Simultaneously, the formula of 
consensus confirmed at Taif, with its flaws and misdeeds related to the inclusion of warlords 
in the post-war government elite, guaranteed a return to the representative character of the 
Lebanese political system, and freedom of opinion in society. But now, the confessional 
distribution of seats in the parliament and government was being altered by the display of 
wealth and physical intimidation. Thus, a difference in scale in the use of sheer violence, and 
a power hierarchy between the two polities, were substituted for their difference in nature: 
powerful Syria dominated a weak Lebanon, both regimes being closely intertwined through 
clientelist relations.  
Third, the Lebanese war, in combination with the limited Syrian infitâh, accelerated the 
inscription of the local economies in dense and diversified trans-regional networks made up of 
financial transfers and the importation of goods, and, moreover, characterised by the growing 
mobility of skilled professionals. Lebanon had indeed been a precursor of globalisation by 
earning its prosperity as a hub connecting the Gulf countries to Europe already in the 1960s 
and 1970s. The difference, now, was not only of magnitude, but also in the dichotomy often 
referred to as „glocalisation‟ (Appadurai 1996): on the one hand, a capacity to change places, 
shift roles, adopt a different status, and build human experience beyond the traditional 
circulation of money and goods, that contributed to the emergence of individualism among 
Arab Near Eastern upper classes; on the other hand, a growing consciousness of, and loyalty 
to, prescribed identities and local belongings, which resulted in the consolidation of infra- and 
trans-boundary solidarities, while challenging the nation-state framework (Roy 2000). 
 
 
Old and new Syrian business in Lebanon 
 
Economic reconstruction was considered a priority by the post-war governments of Lebanon, 
rather than social reconciliation or political reform (Débié and Pieter 2003). The cost of 
rehabilitating of the infrastructure and public utilities, estimated at around $2.2 billion in the 
early 1990s, soon soared to more than 30 billion, and the process was still far from complete 
thirteen years later (Hamdane 2000: 70). On the whole, it offered exceptional opportunities to 
the market and business companies. In the domain of importating, things were not so 
stimulating since the slump of the Lebanese pound (down 500 times from 1975 to 1995) 
rendered foreign products over-expensive for middle- and lower-class consumption.  
In general, businessmen of Syrian origin had resisted the war turmoil well and, while they 
confessed to having travelled abroad more often than their Lebanese counterparts, they were 
still to be found in eminent positions in the banking, contracting and importing sectors in the 
aftermath of the war. Was such durability due to their far-sighted and cautious management, 
as they proudly claimed, or was it their past experience in adapting to political upheavals? 
Syrian identity among the business community was more than ever associated (at least in their 
discourse) with wealth and discretion. The few Syrian members registered in the Beirut 
branch of the Lebanese-Syrian Chamber of Commerce founded in 1995 under the auspices of 
the government in Damascus, did not belong to the milieu of immigrants settled in the country 
in the 1950s and 1960s who rather chose to turn away from an institution obviously linked 
with the Syrian regime. They found it safer and more efficient to take advantage of their 
personal long-standing connexions. Moreover, it became more difficult after the war to 
distinguish „Syrian‟ capital and managers in Lebanese enterprises, since restructuring, inter-
marriage, and the passage of one generation (from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s) blurred 
„national‟ identities among businessmen. I have often been misled by insiders who drew my 
attention to this or that actor, only to discover that the man originated from Palestine, or from 
a specific area of Lebanon, but not from Syria proper.  
However, there has been an important change in the composition of the Syrian business 
community in Lebanon. Since the second half of the Lebanese war (after 1982), and more 
extensively in the reconstruction period, the émigré business community was joined in the 
Lebanese arena by a new brand of Syrian entrepreneurs and investors (Bahout 1994) who 
owed their accumulation of capital to profits made in relation to public enterprises in Syria, 
mainly importing for the public sector. This „state bourgeoisie‟ (Perthes 1992) had been 
granted special rights to operate across the border, especially the right to deal in foreign 
currencies, and enjoyed personal protection froma patron and partner, a member of the Syrian 
military or Ba„th party leadership.  
Due to such military-mercantile collusion, the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, which lasted 
nearly thirty years, although not everywhere as continuously as in such areas as Akkar or the 
Hirmil-Biqa‟a, has sometimes been analysed as class-oriented. A regime whose leadership 
originated principally from the underdeveloped rural areas of Syria (the jabalAnsarieh, but 
also the eastern Euphrates valley, and the Hawran) strove to take its revenge on the Lebanese 
capitalists for the comparatively mediocre record of the Syrian economy since the breaking 
off of the Intérêtscommuns. Thus, the Ba‟thist power took advantage of its military control of 
the Lebanese territory to pillage the local economy. While privates and non-commissioned 
officers looted houses to bring home cars, fridges and TV sets, senior officers in charge of 
various Lebanese regions reigned over quasi-fiefdoms, and accumulated capital mainly 
through the control of intense smuggling of consumer goods (oil) and illicit products 
(narcotics) across the Lebanese-Syrian boundary (Sadowski 1985). After several decades of 
relative deprivation in comparison with Lebanon, „ils [the Syrians] se sontrefaits‟.11 
After the war, the institutionalisation of Syrian-Lebanese relations via a series of agreements 
signed in the 1990s, and the numerous opportunities offered by the reconstruction, brought 
this new Syrian bourgeoisie directly on to the Lebanese market, in close relation to their 
enriched military patrons (here likewise, genealogical and marital links between both groups 
were salient and significant). These new economic actors succeeded in imposing themselves 
as partners in major contracts such as in cellular phones as well as on the real estate market, 
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thus revealing their interest in levying taxes, securing rents, and living in lavish suites looking 
on to the Mediterranean, rather than investing in the economic recovery of Lebanon. With 
those of their Syrian fellow-countrymen established in Beirut business and banking since the 
1960s, they shared in various Lebanese reconstruction contracts, including the controversial 
Solidere project for downtown Beirut. However, contrary to a cliché invoking ethnic (or 
sectarian), local (such as between Aleppians), and national solidarity, the latter did not 
become privileged partners of these powerful nouveaux riches who preferred to deal with ex-
militia leaders and new Lebanese tycoons like Hariri. Between the various groups of Syrians 
investing in the Lebanese economy, there was competition; deals were struck and interests 
converged according to individual and network preferences. National identity was not the 
decisive criterion. 
In one domain, however, had the long established bourgeoisie were obliged to deal inevitably 
with their fellow countrymen: banking. For not only had private banks been banned from 
Syria since the 1960s, but, as mentioned earlier, capital and managers of Syrian origin had 
made their way to the core of the Lebanese financial landscape. Although it was sometimes 
argued that Syrian capitalists preferred European rather than Lebanese banking institutions, 
while Syrian deposits in Lebanon represented only a temporary step towards safer accounts 
overseas in spite of the attractiveness of Lebanese banking secrecy, the amount of Syrian 
deposits in private accounts in Lebanese banks was estimated at over $6 billion in 2003 (Daily 
Star, 22 April 2003: 4).
12
 
When it came to the major financial arrangements related to projects in real estate or in the 
new Lebanese economy, new Syrian investments were often managed in those powerful 
Beirut institutions where Syrian émigrés had long played a leading role either as owners or as 
managers. New Syrianinvestorsfelt „represented by thesebanks‟, namely, bankssuch as 
Banque du Liban et d‟Outre-Mer, Audi, Banque Européenne pour le Moyen-Orient, or 
Société Libanaise de Banque.
13
In return, negotiations and transactions with Syrian investors 
placed Syrian bank managers in a web of mixed feelings, and contradictory loyalties. 
According to their comments, professionalism and interest prevailed over identity logics in 
dictating their attitudes. They were eager to show national and international institutions like 
Union des Banques du Liban and the International Monetary Fund that they could handle such 
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deals with neutrality and success. But they also had to be careful not to confront powerful 
members of the Damascus elite, for undeniably security reasons. Moreover, they were 
preparing for a major financial and political challenge: in the 1990s, Syria was about to re-
authorise private banking activities on its national territory. 
 
 
A new regionalism? 
 
In 1991, when discussing the content of the Lebanese-Syrian treaty of Brotherhood and Co-
operation with a Lebanese economist and future minister of Finance, I hinted that, in spite of 
its blatant bias in favour of Syria, the forced rapprochement could offer a long awaited 
opportunity to reverse the bilateral balance of power, as Lebanese economic actors would be 
given a chance to turn the military domination by Syria into an economic domination by 
Lebanon. Lebanese industries and exports would benefit from the opening of a 16 million 
consumers market next door, and be stimulated by the diminution of custom fees.
14
 In other 
words, businessmen of Syrian origin would take advantage of their knowledge of local needs 
and consumers‟ habits, as well as of their connexions with the local society. Indeed, at that 
time, certain Syrian expatriates from Lebanon cautiously attempted to reactivate a few 
industrial activities, preferably in Aleppo where state control was less felt than in Damascus 
or Lattaquié. However, the limited liberalisation of the Syrian market, and the emergence of 
an enriched bourgeoisie with new consumerist behaviour, opened up little space for the 
official exportation of Lebanese products, as confirmed by the record of bilateral trade 
figures.
15
 
For their part, Syrian industrialists resisted Lebanese concurrence. They strove to avoid the 
mediation of Lebanese importers in order to deal directly with foreign, mainly European, 
firms. They endeavoured to supply their domestic market with consumer goods of the kind 
manufactured in Lebanon but at cheaper prices. Also, while smuggling decreased in the post-
war period, due to the reduction in custom duties, and Bashar al-Asad‟s crackdowns on 
smuggling networks in 1995 and 1999, parallel off-the-record arrangements still accounted 
for a major part of imports from Lebanon to Syria. On the whole, what could be observed 
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were only the sketchy outlines of an emerging sub-regional economic space including 
Lebanon and Syria. This economic region, although controlled by a single political power, 
was far from unified, mainly because of the different standards of living in the two 
countries,
16
 and the long period of socialisation and politicisation by two dissimilar regimes. 
At least, what was taking place in the field of production and trade was a kind of forced 
complementarity. For the Syrian expatriate community in Lebanon, the fact that the Ba„thist 
regime was still unpredictable, the financial legislation obsolete, and the resources of the 
society limited, constituted as many invisible barriers to their crossing back to Syria. 
Banking was another issue. While the re-opening of private institutions had become a matter 
of economic urgency for Syria since the late 1980s, it was understood that the country lacked 
the necessary capital, officially at least.
17
 The legal and practical aspects were discussed in 
successive open nadawât (meetings) held alternately in Beirut and Damascus in 2000 to 2002, 
with the most important in January 2003 in Damascus under the title „Lebanese-Syrian 
banking co-operation‟, attended by tens of managers of the largest Lebanese banks, who did 
not spare their criticisms and demands on the Syrian government. Negotiations between 
Syrian senior civil servants and Lebanese top bank managers, many of them of Syrian origin, 
respected the codes of local civilities. At some point, however, emotion and bitterness 
showed, and the discussion became more like a family dispute than an international 
negotiation. It was frank, also, as many bankers had an intimate knowledge of Syrian financial 
institutions, of the practices of the political leadership as well as of the size of its underground 
transactions.
18
They were especially cautious about securing legal international guarantees 
against Syria‟s erratic monetary policies and fixed interest rates, as well as the government‟s 
meddling in their future activities.  
The laborious negotiations between the Syrian government and some of these banks also 
involved the International Finance Corporation (the World Bank’s private sector arm) and the 
Commission of the European Union. In 2001, Law 24 allowing the private sector to operate in 
Syria was adopted: this required a 51 per cent Syrian holding in the capital of the new banks. 
And in spring 2003, the first three Lebanese banks (along with three others) were granted 
approval. Their chairmen, all of them Syrian expatriates, announced that they had struck deals 
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with local investors, among them the powerful head of the Union of Syrian Chambers of 
Commerce. Interestingly, one of the three banks concerned was approved two months after 
the others, and it was hinted that its chairman had been unable to prove his Syrian identity. 
Although the problem was soon settled, and the 51 per cent Syrian majority secured, the irony 
of the situation did not escape observers‟ attention. Some forty years after fleeing their 
country and reneging on their national identity, Syrian businessmen in Lebanon were looking 
back over the international boundary, invoking their ancient citizenship, and seeking a 
privileged economic return. 
All this at least suggests that in the future Lebanese Syrian sub-regional economic space, 
Syrian expatriate businessmen may play a pivotal role. Their „straddling‟ posture allows them 
to make the most profit from the slow ongoing process, thanks to their experience in both 
countries their knowledge of procedures, and their inscription in networks operating across 
the boundary. Once the most convinced advocates of the construction of a solid Lebanese-
Syrian boundary, they are cautiously promoting fair bilateral cooperation, and the 
construction of a joint economic space. For this purpose, they have to pay the price of seeing 
their identity challenged and their past questioned, and become entrusted with the 
responsibilities of „good governance‟ according to the Washingtonian rules; in a word, to live 
with the paradoxes of post-modernity. In the meantime, they enjoy flying from Beirut to 
Aleppo for lavish weekends in the city‟s aristocratic Beits, transformed into luxury hotels. 
Back in the ambience of their forlorn dreams, they negotiate contracts and draw up investment 
projects.   
How relevant does the ottomanism paradigm remain for analysing Syrian-Lebanese relations 
today? On the one hand, the relatively short history of each state suggests a strong tendency 
towards differentiation and the formation of a specific national identity grounded in a state-
controlled territory. Whatever its flaws, especially in the Middle East, the nation-state model 
has a future ahead of it, be it only for the ambitions of local elites. To this state-building 
process, the Syrian émigré businessmen brought more than their fair share: Not only did they 
transfer their symbolic and material capital from one side of the border to the other, thus 
contributing to a lasting imbalance between the Syrian and the Lebanese economies, but they 
also endeavoured – discreetly and, on some occasions such as during the civil war, openly – 
to shape a Lebanese polity antinomic to the Syrian polity they had escaped from. The fragile 
Beirut Spring of 2005, which saw hundreds of thousands demanding the end of thirty years of 
Syrian military presence on Lebanese soil, bears witness to their success and to the 
indisputable existence of national boundaries in the Arab Levant.  
 On the other hand,however, the transformation of the local societies during the past century 
in Syria as well as in Lebanon, and the modernisation of the local economies, have resulted in 
the growing mobility of individuals across the international boundary (such as Syrian workers 
in the Lebanese manpower market), and in the strengthening of infrastructural (power lines, 
pipelines, motorways etc.) as well as social and cultural networks. However reluctantly, the 
Syrian émigré community in Lebanon was bound to play a pioneering role in the revival of 
historical networks, as can be observed in the process of developing the private banking sector 
in Syria in the 2000s. The recent investment of émigré bankers in the fragile Syrian market 
and the plans of their fellow businessmen do not only express the selfish greed of „unruly 
capitalism‟ taking advantage of the wind of deregulation. They also relate to that intangible 
element we call culture: ethics, values, habits, practices, inscribed in durable, quiet memories 
of an idealised past, when the empire was without boundaries. The nostalgia of ottomanism 
feeds their strategies across the boundary.  
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